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We develop a dynamic credit risk model for the case that banks compete to collect 
their loans from a firm falling in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a game-theoretic real 
options approach to investigate bank’s optimal strategies. Our model reveals that the 
bank with the larger loan amount, namely the main bank, provides an additional loan to 
support the deteriorating firm when the other bank collects its loan. This suggests that 
there exists rational forbearance lending by the main bank. Comparative statics show 
that as the liquidation value is lower, the optimal exit timing for the non-main bank 
comes at an earlier stage of business downturn and the optimal liquidation timing by the 
main bank is delayed further. As the interest rate of the loan is lower, the optimal exit 
timing for the non-main bank comes earlier. These analyses are consistent with the 
forbearance lending and exposure concentration of main banks observed in Japan. 
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From the mid 1990s, Japanese banks struggled with nonperforming loan problems. 
The problems partly emerged from the risk embedded in relationship banking. The 
disadvantages and advantages of the relationship have been discussed in the banking 
theory literature (for details, see Boot [2000] and Elyasiani and Goldberg [2004]). As is 
well known, the first advantage is a reduction of inefficiency stemming from 
asymmetric information between a bank and a firm. The second is to facilitate an 
implicit long-term contract through risk sharing such that a bank maintains a stable loan 
interest rate even if the firm’s credit risk fluctuates. These benefits, however, potentially 
turn into disadvantages. For example, monopolistic lending as a consequence of a long-
term relationship between a bank and a firm gives rise to the hold-up problem, that is, 
the bank’s strong bargaining power gives the firm an incentive to borrow from other 
banks. The firm, therefore, prefers multiple banking relationships despite additional 
administrative costs. Another disadvantage is the soft-budget problem, which comes 
from an implicit long-term contract. When Japanese banks struggled with the 
nonperforming loan problem, it was often cited as a typical example of the problem 
posed by Japanese banks’ forbearance lending to deteriorating firms in order to avoid 
losses from firms’ bankruptcy. Banks’ arbitrary policies regarding their support for 
firms reduced their discipline for credit risk management.
 1 
Multiple banking relationships in some countries are combined with a main bank 
system. In this system, one particular bank that holds the largest share of a firm’s debt is 
defined as a main bank. The main bank faces the responsibility of monitoring the firm’s 
condition, in return for holding the largest share of lending and providing other financial 
services to the firm. Within the main bank system, a soft-budget problem might be more 
serious. When the credit condition of the firm worsens, the non-main bank might collect 
its outstanding loans from the firm. Unless the main bank provides an additional loan to 
fill the shortage of firm’s loan demand, the main bank immediately suffers from the 
firm’s bankruptcy because of a lack of liquidity. We, therefore, name the main bank’s 
additional loan instead of the non-main bank, ”debt assumption.” Forbearance lending, 
however, might lead to a large loss for the main bank in the future. An arbitrary lending 
policy in relationship banking is required for a certain decision rule. As for the non-
                                                      
1 The soft-budget problem highlights the difference between ex ante efficiency and ex post efficiency. In this paper, 
ex ante efficiency corresponds to the optimal exit strategy without thought for other banks’ lending strategies as 
discussed later. The equilibrium of the game with consideration of counterparts’ strategies represents ex post 
efficiency. Hence, “arbitrary policy”, here, means the main bank’s policy without consideration of the other banks’ 
policies. 
1 main bank, it also faces uncertainty regarding the exit timing from lending to the firm. 
The optimal timing is determined by the trade-off between an increase in credit risk and 
an opportunity to gain future earnings from their loan to the firm. In this paper, we 
propose a theoretical model to measure banks’ credit risk in a game between a main 
bank and non-main bank concerning their exit timing and their decisions about the debt 
assumptions. 
First, assuming that a firm borrows from one bank, we examine the optimal exit 
strategy from the lending to the firm. The strategy can be developed using real options 
theory using the stochastic process of firm value. This approach is developed by Leland 
[1994] and Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997]. Real options theory pays attention to the 
bank’s waiting option to collect its loan from the deteriorating firm considering the firm 
may avoid bankruptcy. It may be optimal for the bank to exit later. The real options 
model gives a threshold level of firm value for the bank’s decision on exiting under 
uncertainty of firm value. Baba [2001] developed a theoretical model to investigate 
optimal timing in bank’s writing off its nonperforming loan using real options approach. 
Second, we assume that a firm borrows from two banks: one is the main bank and the 
other is the non-main bank. This setup introduces a game-theoretic view into the real 
options model. We extend the real options model of Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997] 
to a game-theoretic real options model. This approach is developed by Dixit and 
Pindyck [1994] to explain the optimal entry timing in a market in which another player 
also waits for his/her optimal entry time. They show that there exists an equilibrium 
where one of the potential entrants invests earlier than the other. In addition, the 
investment timing of the first-mover is earlier than the noncompetitive real options case. 
Grenadier [1996] applied this approach to a real estate market to explain “over-
building,” a variant of overinvestment as a barrier to new entrants. Weeds [2002] 
applied this approach to firms’ R&D investment and compared the results of a 
cooperative game with those of a noncooperative game. These studies examined the 
entry game with real options theory, while our study focuses on the exit game. 
Similarly to the entry game, our game-theoretic real options model has a unique 
equilibrium. The equilibrium analysis shows that a difference in the loan amount 
between the two banks results in a difference in the optimal timing of exit. The main 
bank makes debt assumptions in terms of its maximization of the loan value, even if the 
non-main bank exits earlier. 
Our model does not describe rational forbearance lending, but does give both banks’ 
measure of their credit risk based on the outlook of the game. In addition, we examine 
2 through comparative statics the impacts of changes in exogenous variables, such as the 
liquidation value of the firm, the interest rate of loan and the volatility of firm value, on 
both banks’ exit strategies. Each bank determines its optimal exit strategy by taking into 
account the other bank’s optimal strategy and the equilibrium is given in this game-
theoretic situation. 
These comparative statics reveal the following. 
1) The lower the liquidation value of the firm, the earlier the non-main bank exits. In 
contrast, the lower the liquidation value, the later the main bank liquidates the firm. 
2) The lower the interest rate of the loan, the earlier the non-main bank exits. 
3) The higher the volatility of firm value, the later both banks exit and liquidate the 
firm. However, much higher volatility causes an incentive to exit for the non-main 
bank. 
These results are consistent with the forbearance lending and exposure concentration 
observed within main banks in Japan. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the benchmark 
model of monopoly lending developed by Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997]. It shows 
how the real options approach helps us determine the optimal timing of exit. Section 3 
extends the benchmark model to a game in which a firm borrows from two banks. 
Section 4 examines the equilibrium of the model described in Section 3. Section 5 
discusses the comparative statics and implications. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Benchmark model for monopoly lending 
First, we examine simple monopoly lending using real options theory, following 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin [1997]. We explore a model in which a firm finances its 
business with debt and equity. One bank supplies the loan and a representative equity 
holder controls the firm. 
 
(1) Model settings 
We denote  the sales of the firm as Xt and assume that Xt follows a geometric 
Brownian motion under a risk-neutral measure: 
  t t t t dz X dt X dX σ μ + = ,  x X = 0 ,  (1)
where μ and σ are constant and zt is a standard Brownian motion process. 
We assume constant variables for the following parameters: 
3 w: the operating costs of the firm, 
M: the principal of the bank’s loan, 
C: the liquidation value of the firm, 
c: the ratio of loan value covered by the liquidation (defined by C/M),
 2 
r: the risk-free rate, i.e., the discount rate under the risk-neutral measure, and 
b: the interest rate of the loan. 
We assume that the drift of the firm’s sales μ is less than the risk-free rate r.
 3 We 
also assume that the interest rate of the loan b is greater than r. 
The equity holder and the bank determine their optimal strategies, respectively, based 
on their common knowledge of the stochastic process of Xt and the current value of Xt. 
The choices of the equity holder are either to run the firm or to go bankrupt at each t 
under observed Xt. In the case of bankruptcy, the firm is owned by the debt holder, i.e., 
the bank, and after bankruptcy the bank runs the firm. The bank’s choice is either to run 
the firm or to liquidate it at each t after the bankruptcy. We denote the bankruptcy time 
as τb and the liquidation time as τc. We also denote   as the filtration sets of the 
information on Xt, and 
[ -
t ;  as the set of stopping times on the information set  . The 
conditional expectation about 
[ -
t -  is given by  ( ) ( ) t t - | ⋅ = ⋅   . 
Now, we formulate the optimization problem for the equity holder. The equity holder 
decides the optimal timing of bankruptcy to maximize the equity value in each t, and the 
maximized value is given by: 
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The equity value E(x) equals the maximized present value of the firm’s profits before 
the firm’s bankruptcy ( b t τ < ). After the bankruptcy ( t b ≤ τ ), the equity holder leaves 
the firm’s ownership to the bank. We denote the optimal τb as  .  t b ; ∈
* τ
After bankruptcy occurs, the bank decides the timing of liquidation to maximize the 
loan value under the given value of τb
*. The optimized timing   is determined by 
the maximization problem as follows: 
t c ; ∈
* τ
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2 We assume c is less than 1. 
3 This assumption is a necessary condition for the discounted present value of the firm’s profit to converge to a finite 
value. If r >μ holds, then the integral ∫[0,∞) e 
–rt (X0 e 
μt) dt converges to X0/ (r–μ). However, the integral diverges to 
infinity if r ≤ μ. 
4 where D(x) represents the maximized loan value at time t before τb
*. The first term of 
the conditional expectation in equation (3) represents the present value of the interest 
incomes bM before bankruptcy occurs ( ). The second term represents the present 
value of the bank’s earnings in the s periods from the bankruptcy to the liquidation 
( ). The earnings of the firm’s owner are given by Xs – w during the s periods. 
The third term represents the present value of the liquidation value of the firm. 
*
b t τ <
c b t τ τ < <
*
 
(2) The option values of bankruptcy and liquidation 
The optimization problem for the equity holder in equation (2) can be solved 
analytically (see Appendix 1). The maximized equity value E(x) is given by: 
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The first term of the right-hand side of equation (4) is the present value of the firm’s 
earnings before the bankruptcy.
  4  This value is an increasing function of the initial 
firm’s sales x and the drift of the firm’s sales μ. It is also a decreasing function of the 
operating cost w, the interest rate r, and the loan amount M. Note that it does not depend 
on the volatility σ in the stochastic process of Xt, because the value is derived as the 
optimization of the expected value under the risk-neutral measure. The second term 
represents the option value of the equity holder owning the right to bankrupt the firm. 
We name it the bankruptcy option. The bankruptcy option depends on the volatility σ 
and increases as σ increases.
 5  This implies that the bankruptcy option becomes more 
valuable as the firm’s sales become more volatile. 
To examine how the option value earnings, we show the interpretation of the 
threshold value xb corresponding to τb
*.  The term ( )
γ
b x x  in  equation  (4) is the 
                                                      
4 The term x is discounted by r–μ while the term w + bM is discounted by r. This is because Xt has the drift μ as 
shown in equation (1). 
5 Differentiation of equation (4) with respect to σ yields dE/dσ = {(∂E/∂xb) (∂xb/∂γ) + ∂E/∂γ} ∂γ/∂ = (∂E/∂γ) (∂γ/∂σ) 
(Notice that ∂E/∂xb = 0). Thus, dE/dσ > 0 because ∂E/∂γ = {– xb /(r–μ) + (w + bM)/r} (x/xb)
γlog(x/xb) > 0 and (∂γ/∂σ) 
> 0. 
5 probability that x reaches the threshold value xb,
 6 that is, the probability of bankruptcy. 
We can easily check that ()
γ
b x x  → 0 as x → ∞ and ( ) 1 =
γ
b x x  at x = xb. Thus, the first 
term in the equity value E(x) dominates as x → ∞ and reaches zero at bankruptcy x = xb. 
In addition, the marginal value of the equity at bankruptcy E’(xb) also reaches zero. 
Furthermore, E(x) smoothly passes zero at x = xb. The equity value function is depicted 
by Figure 1. 
The bankruptcy option increases the equity value, which implies that it, in turn, 
decreases the value of loan for the bank. Once the optimal timing of the bankruptcy is 
given by the time when x reaches the threshold value xb of (5), the maximized loan 
value D(x) and the threshold value of x for the liquidation are given by: 
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b   (7) 
and:   















cM xc   (8) 
The derivations of these are shown in Appendix 2.  
Equation (6) is interpreted as follows. The first term represents the present value of 
the interest incomes and the second term is the negative option value resulting from the 
equity holder’s option on bankruptcy. The latter decreases the loan value   as x 
declines.   is close to   as x reaches xb, while 
() x D
() x D () x D
b x x≤ | ( ) x D  is close to the first term 
in equation (6) as x → ∞.   represents the loan value after bankruptcy, given by  () x D
b x x≤ |
(7). 
Equation (7) shows the present value of the firm that the bank inherits from the equity 
holder at the time τb*. The first and second terms represent the value to the bank of 
running the firm after the bankruptcy. The bank obtains the total profit of the firm, 
while the equity holder obtains the firm’s profit after interest payments, as shown in 
equation (4). The third term is the option value of the bank having the right to postpone 
                                                      
6 Strictly speaking, (x/xb)
γ is the present value of the probability of bankruptcy, which is given by E(exp(–rτb)) = ∫[0,∞) 
e
–rt E(t ≤ τb < t + dt). See Dixit and Pindyck [1994].  
6 the liquidation of the firm in order to bet on the firm’s recovery. The option value is 
proportional to the probability of liquidation ( )
γ
c x x   and the loss (or profit) at 
liquidation, which is given by the difference between the liquidation value C(= cM) and 
the value of running the firm.  ( ) x D
b x x≤ |  is an increasing function of x. It reaches the 
liquidation value C; as x approaches xc, the threshold value of the liquidation given by 
equation (8). The smoothness condition  ( ) 0 = ′ c x D  is assumed in the maximization of 
equation (3) to obtain equations (6), (7) and (8), which are required for the optimality of 
the liquidation threshold xc. 
Figure 1 shows the value functions of the equity and the loan that correspond to 
equations (2) and (3). The optimal timings of the bankruptcy and the liquidation are 
given by the points where the value function curves are smoothly pasting to zero and C, 
respectively.
 7 The loan value curve has an upper bound given by the present value of 
interest incomes. The bound corresponds to the value in the case of x  →  ∞, i.e., 
bankruptcy probability → 0. As long as C is less than M, i.e., c is less than a unit, the 
equity holder accepts bankruptcy earlier than the bank accepts liquidation. 
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7 See Dixit and Pindyck [1994]. 
7 3. Extended model for duopoly lending 
In this section, we extend the benchmark model to the case where a firm borrows 
from two banks. In the previous section, one bank provided a loan to the firm and the 
bank’s collecting the loan meant that the firm is liquidated by the bank. In the duopoly 
lending case, the equity holder runs the firm as long as the total amount of the loan is 
maintained. In the duopoly case, the optimal bankruptcy timing is earlier than when 
banks collect their loans in the monopoly case. We, therefore, investigate an exit game 
between two banks where one of the banks might make a debt assumption when the 
other bank collects its loan. The decision of the debt assumption depends on the 
optimization problem for the bank that faces the first action by the other bank. In this 
section, we examine the optimization problem for the first-mover, and for the other, 
assigning a bank to the role of either the first-mover or the other.  
 
(1) Model settings 
Neither bank determines its strategy cooperatively. We have two banks: bank A and 
bank B. Bank i exits earlier than bank j ( { } B A j i , , ∈ ) and thus we refer to i as “the 
leader” and j as “the follower.” The model in this section yields the optimal strategy 
given the counterpart’s strategy, preparing for the noncooperative game in the next 
section. 
All parameters except the loan amount are the same for banks A and B, and denoted 
as in Section 2. Each loan amount for banks A and B is denoted as   and  , 
respectively. We also define m A and mB as each bank’s share of total loan, that is, 
A M B M
{ B A i M M m i i , ∈ = } , where  M M M B A = + . If bank i exits earlier than bank j 
( ), then the follower bank j might make a debt assumption of Mi, the amount 
of the loan that the leader bank i collects from the firm. When the follower bank j 
liquidates the firm after the debt assumption, bank j obtains the liquidation value C, 
where  . We do not assume whether bank A or B becomes the leader at this stage, 
but we will show that the difference between MA and MB determines the leader, later on. 
{ B A j i , , ∈
M C <
}
The optimization problem for the equity holder is the same as in Section 2. 
Furthermore, the optimal bankruptcy timing   is given as in Section 2. 
*
b τ
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where   is the leader’s loan value and   is the exit timing for the leader 






t m ; ∈ τ
*
m τ
(9) represents the present value 
of the leader’s interest incomes before the bankruptcy occurs ( ). The second term 
represents the present value of the leader’s earnings in the periods from the bankruptcy 
to the exit ( ).
*
b t τ <
m t τ < ≤
8 Because we assume that both banks maintain their exiting loan 
shares after the bankruptcy, the second term is composed of the firm’s profit divided by 
its lending share after the bankruptcy. The third term represents the present value of the 
leader’s collection of its loan principal miM at t=τm.   is derived from the optimization 
in equation (9). 
The follower bank determines  , the optimal timing of the liquidation after it makes 
a debt assumption at  .    might be close to  , but we assume   must be later than 
. We exclude the possibility of simultaneous exits of both banks, because the 
continuous  x process assures anticoincidence between xb and xm for heterogeneous 
banks with respect to loan amount Mi. The optimization problem for the follower bank 























⋅ − + ⋅ =
− − − − − −




C e ds w X e M m e




















) ( ) ( ) (















The first term in equation (10) represents the present value of the follower’s interest 
income before the bankruptcy ( ). The second term represents the present value of 
the follower’s earnings after the bankruptcy ( ). The third term represents the 
present value of the follower’s new loan instead of the leader’s collection at t = . The 
fourth term represents the present value of the follower’s earnings in the period from   
to  . The last term represents the present value of liquidation at t = τc. 
*
b t τ <








                                                      
8 If the leader exits before the bankruptcy, the integral interval in the first term has to be changed from [t, τb
*] to [t, τm] 
and the second term is not needed. 
9 (2) The valuation for each loan value  
The maximized leader’s loan value ( ) x D
L
i  can be obtained analytically as follows: 
 


























































































See Appendix 3 for the derivation. 
Equation (11) represents the leader’s loan value before the bankruptcy. The first term 
represents the present value of the interest incomes and the second term corresponds to 
the negative option value stemming from the equity holder’s execution of the 
bankruptcy option. These formulas are similar to those in the benchmark model (6), 
while the loan value after the bankruptcy  ( ) x D
b x x
L
i ≤ |  includes xm instead of xc in the 
benchmark model (7). The second term represents the positive option value of the leader 
being able to exit earlier than the follower. 
The positive option value is determined by i) the probability that the leader collects 
its loan at x, i.e., (
γ
m x x ) , and ii) the loan principal minus the loan value measured by 
the present value of the profits in the case of x = xm. The latter represents the leader’s 
net gain when the leader collects its loan at x. The multiple of the gain and the exit 
probability yields the option value of early exit from lending. 
Note that the threshold value of the leader’s exit shown in equation (13) is 
independent of its loan amount. This is because the leader determines the exit timing by 
the gap between the total loan amount M and the value of total loan at xm. mi in the 
second term of the equation (12) operates only as a multiplier. 
The option value increases as x → xm from above and reaches the maximum at x = xm, 
where the leader exercises its exit option. At this point, the leader’s loan value  ( ) x D
b x x
L
i ≤ |  
is equal to its loan principal, miM. We assume that the loan value pastes smoothly to the 




i m x x D
b  at the maximization of equation (9). 
The bankruptcy threshold xb in (5) is larger than the leader’s exit threshold xm in (13), 
10 because we assume the loan interest rate b is greater than the risk-free rate r. The leader, 
therefore, always exits after the bankruptcy. 
Figure 2 depicts the leader’s loan value function given by equation (11), normalizing 
the value by its loan principal. The value is always larger than a unit from the 
assumption that the leader can collect the loan principal at the exit by the follower’s 
debt assumption. The value pastes smoothly to the normalized loan principal value, i.e., 
a unit. As the firm’s sales x increases, the probability of bankruptcy in equation (11) 
decreases and the lower probability reduces the negative option value in absolute terms, 
which increases the loan value. The loan value converges to the present value of the 
interest income, the first term of equation (11) as x → ∞. 
The leader’s loan value is larger than the loan value of the monopoly lending because 
the leader holds the option to exit earlier, which the monopoly bank does not. As shown 
in Figure 2, a decline of x increases the difference between normalized   and  () x D
L
i ( ) x D  
in the monopoly case. 
 
Figure 2. The value of the leader’s loan 
( ) x E
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11 Next, we consider the follower’s loan value  ( ) x D
F
j . The maximal value is obtained 
given bankruptcy threshold xb and exit threshold xm as follows: 
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and: 
γ







































m | .  (16)
See Appendix 3 for derivation. 
The follower’s loan value in equation (14) is similar to the leader’s value in equation 
(11), but it is different by the term  ( ) x D
b x x
F
j ≤ |  corresponding to the follower’s loan 
value after the bankruptcy. The second term of  ( ) x D
b x x
F
j ≤ |  in  equation  (15) is the 
“negative” option value for the follower. The leader’s option to exit yields a negative 
option for the follower.
  9  ( ) x D
m x x
F
j ≤ |   is defined by equation (16). The first term of 
equation (16) is the present value of the firm’s profits minus the leader’s loan principal, 
which is identical to the amount of the debt assumption for the follower. The second 
term is the option value for the follower of liquidating the firm. The gap between the 
liquidation value cM and the firm’s discounted profits measured by x = xc represents the 
gain from the liquidation. The amount of the gain and the probability of liquidation 
()
γ
c x x  yield the liquidation option value. 
The relation xc ≤ xm holds by the assumption  M C < . This implies that the optimal 
liquidation timing is later than the leader’s exit. It is rational for the follower to make 
the debt assumption in this model and to run the firm by itself until x reaches xc. This is 
because that the follower cannot recover its loan principal immediately by the 
assumption   and it thus has the incentive to make a debt assumption to wait for 
the firm’s recovery. 
M C <
Figure 3 depicts the follower’s loan value function by a solid bold line. It is always 
less than the monopoly loan value because of the “negative” option value. Naturally, 
banks A and B both want to avoid being the follower. In the next section, we investigate 
                                                      
9 The negative option is defined by using the gap between the loan value after the leader’s exit  , and the loan 
value measured by x = xm before the debt assumption. The latter is greater than the former from the former before the 





12 the equilibrium in the game between the two banks. 
 
Figure 3. The value of the follower’s loan 
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4. The equilibrium  
In this section, we examine the equilibrium of the model described in Section 3. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that bank A has a larger loan than bank B. We 
regard bank A as the “main bank” and bank B as the “non-main bank.” The only 
difference between the main and non-main bank is the loan amount. 
First, we examine the follower’s loan value assuming each bank is in the position of 
the follower. Figure 4 depicts the follower’s value for the main bank,  , by a solid 




( ) x D
F
B , by solid bold line 
under the assumption that   = 80% and   = 20%. The follower’s value for the non-
main bank is less than that for the main bank, because the burden of the debt assumption 
on the non-main bank is larger than that on the main bank in the case that the firm is 
finally liquidated. The larger miM is in equation 
A m B m
(16), the larger the negative option 
value in equation (15) in absolute value. The larger negative option value for the non-
13 main bank makes the follower’s value curve for the bank lower than that for the main 
bank. 
When the non-main bank collects its loan principal, the bank abandons the future 
profits given by  .   in Figure 4, the cross point of the  curve and the 
principal, both normalized by MB, gives the threshold value of x for the optimal exit 
timing for the non-main bank. However,    is not an optimal threshold in the 
equilibrium of the exit game. If the main bank is a follower, the same discussion holds. 
 corresponds to the threshold for the main bank. Note that for  , the non-
main bank deduces that the main bank does not exit earlier and it is optimal to continue 































10 For  , both 
banks have an incentive to maintain their lending. If the non-main bank exits at that 
point, it is optimal for the main bank to continue lending by making a debt assumption, 
because the liquidation value corresponding to xc in Figure 4 is the new comparative 
value for the main bank to decide its strategy either to run the firm or to liquidate it. The 
discussion above gives the game equilibrium, 1) for , both banks maintain their 
lending, 2) at , the non-main bank collects its loan and the main bank makes a 
debt assumption, 3) for  the main bank runs the firm, and 4) at , the 








A x x x <
                                                      
10 In the strict sense, the exit threshold is slightly larger than xA
P. At xA
P, the non-main bank is indifferent between 
exiting and continuing operations. 
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5. Comparative statics and implications 
In this section, we consider how exogenous conditions affect the (non-) main bank 
exit strategy. We change the firm’s exogenous parameters such as 1) the liquidation 
value of the firm, 2) the interest rate of the loan, 3) the volatility of the firm’s sales.  
The benchmark parameters are given as follows. 
 
Drift of the process Xt :μ  0%  Volatility of Xt:σ  10% 
Firm’s sales: x  0.5∼1.5  Operating cost: w 1 
Interest rate b 5%  Risk-free  rate  r 2% 
Principal M  10  Principal of main bank MA 7 
Liquidation value C 6  Recovery  ratio  c (= C/M) 60% 
 
 
15 (1) Comparative statics on the firm’s liquidation value 
First, we examine how the banks’ exit strategies vary with the liquidation value. In 
Figure 5, the vertical axis shows the recovery rate of the loan principal at the liquidation 
instead of the liquidation value, and the horizontal axis represents current firm’s sales x, 
i.e., the initial value for future development of the x process. The threshold points, x
P, xb 
and xc, are shown for the case of the benchmark. The main results are as follows. 
i) The exit threshold for the non-main bank x
P increases as the recovery rate c 
decreases. This implies that the non-main bank tends to exit earlier when the 
recovery rate is lower.
 11 
ii) The liquidation threshold for the main bank xc decreases as the recovery rate c 
decreases. This implies that the main bank tends to hesitate regarding liquidation 
when the liquidation value decreases. Because the option value of delaying 
liquidating the firm is higher for the lower recovery rate, it is rational for the main 
bank to wait for the recovery of the firm’s sales x. 
iii) The bankruptcy threshold xb for the equity holder is independent of the liquidation 
value. Because the liquidation value C does not exceed the loan amount M, this 
condition provides the equity holder with less incentive to bet on the sales recovery 
than the main bank, discussed in Section 2. 
In Figure 5, we can also observe that the bankruptcy threshold might be larger than 
the non-main bank’s exit threshold at a high recovery rate, such as more than 80%. In 
this case, both of the banks continue lending after the bankruptcy.  
 
                                                      
11 In the game-theoretic situation, the non-main bank determines the exit strategy comparing the follower’s value with 
the loan principal (the value of exiting as a leader) and thus the follower’s value plays an important role, whereas the 
non-main bank always exits as a leader at the equilibrium. 
16 Figure 5. The banks’ exit strategies and the firm’s liquidation value 
recovery rate c 
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(2) Comparative statics on the interest rate 
Next, we examine how the banks’ exit strategies vary with the interest rate b. The 
main results shown in Figure 6 are as follows. 
i) The exit threshold of the non-main bank x
P increases as the loan interest rate 
decreases. The bank tends to exit earlier when the loan rate is lower. The lower the 
incomes from loan, the lower the value of both banks’ loan.
  12 The liquidation 
threshold xc is independent of the interest rate b (the xc curve is a vertical line in 
Figure 6). This is because the firm’s profit belongs to the banks after the 
bankruptcy and the decision of the liquidation is independent of the interest rate. 
ii) The bankruptcy threshold xb increases as the loan rate increases. The equity holder 
of the firm tends to bankrupt the firm earlier, because the higher interest payment 
decreases the equity value. For loan rates of more than 6% in Figure 6, the 
bankruptcy occurs before the non-main bank’s exit. For this reason, the non-main 
                                                      
12 The declines in the loan values hasten the non-main bank to collect its loan, while the timing of liquidation by the 
main bank does not change. Once the main bank makes its debt assumption, all profits belong to the main bank and 
therefore the threshold xc is independent of the lending rate. 
17 bank’s exit threshold x
P is independent of the loan rate b, i.e., the x
P curve is 
vertical. Because the profits of the firms are shared by both banks in proportion to 
their loan amount, the loan rate does not matter. 
These results suggest that low loan rates tend to increase the loan exposure 
concentration to the main bank and provide a strong incentive for the equity holder to 
lower the firm’s sales x. 
 
Figure 6. The banks’ exit strategies and the loan interest rate  
interest rate b 
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(3) Comparative statics on the volatility of firm sales 
Finally, we examine how the banks’ exit strategies vary with the volatility of the 
firm’s sales σ. The main results shown in Figure 7 are as follows. 
i) The non-main bank tends to exit later as sales volatility increases, because the 
option value to bet on the recovery increases. However, in the case of higher 
volatility such as that greater than 25%, the exit threshold x
P bends backward. We 
provide reasons for this below. 
ii) As the volatility increases, the equity holder tends to reduce firm sales. This is a 
18 similar incentive to the main bank, which has an incentive to delay the liquidation 
of the firm. This is because the waiting option value to bankrupt and liquidate the 
firm increases as the volatility increases. 
 
Figure 7. The banks’ exit strategies and the volatility of the firm’s sales 
volatility σ 

















In the standard real options model, the optimal threshold is a monotonically 
increasing function of sales volatility as shown by the bankruptcy curve in Figure 7. On 
the other hand, in the game-theoretic real options model, the optimal threshold is not 
always a monotonically increasing function of sales volatility, as shown in Kijima and 
Shibata [2005]. The reason is as follows. 
Note that the follower’s value plays an important role in determining the exit strategy. 
As explained in (15)–(17), the follower’s value is composed of the two negative option 
values and one positive option value such that: 
The follower’s option value 
=  negative option value suffering from the equity’s option to bankrupt the firm 
+  negative option value suffering from the leader bank’s option to exit early 
19 +  positive option value generated by the follower bank’s option to liquidate the firm. 
The relative sizes of the positive and negative option values make the exit threshold 
curve backward bending. The increase in the volatility heightens all three options values 
for the main bank, i.e., the follower, on an absolute value basis. For lower volatility, the 
increase in the positive option value exceeds the increase in the negative one, which 
makes the exit threshold for the follower lower. This, in turn, lowers the optimal exit 
threshold for the leader. For higher volatility, in contrast, the increase in the positive 
option value is less than the increase in the negative one. The exit threshold, therefore, 
rises as the volatility increases. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper developed a dynamic model for credit risk in relationship lending. It 
considered the case in which the main bank and the non-main bank play a game of exit 
from their deteriorating lending, and examined their optimal exit strategies by applying 
a game-theoretic real options approach. 
Our model showed that each bank determines the optimal exit strategy by taking into 
account the other bank’s optimal strategy and that the equilibrium of the game depends 
on the difference in the loan amount between the two banks. The main bank with a 
larger loan amount makes a debt assumption rationally in a sense of its maximization of 
the loan value. 
The paper also used comparative statics to examine the effect of exogenous variables, 
such as the liquidation value of the firm and the loan interest rate, on the banks’ 
strategies. First, a low liquidation value makes the non-main bank exit earlier, whereas 
it enhances the main bank’s incentive to delay the liquidation while waiting for the 
firm’s recovery. Second, a low loan rate leads to the early exit of the non-main bank. 
These mechanisms accelerate the concentration of the main bank’s exposure to the 
deteriorating firm. 
Finally, we illustrated how our model can be further developed. First, it would be 
interesting to investigate asymmetric information about the firm between the two banks. 
The main banks may have different information on the stochastic process of initial sales, 
x. Second, it is possible for the main bank to revitalize the firm once the bank owns the 
firm. The bank may reduce the firm’s operating cost and improve the growth rate of the 
firm’s sales. It would be interesting to investigate these extensions to our model. 
20 Appendix 1. The optimization problem for the equity holder 
In this appendix, we show the solution of the optimization problem for the equity 
holder in equation (2). The equation is equivalent to the following HJB (Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman) equation: 
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where    represents the value of the firm for the equity holder. Applying Ito’s 
lemma to the HJB equation  
( t X E )
(A-1), we obtain the following ordinary differential equations of ( ) x E : 
  () () (),
2
1 2 2 x E x x E x bM w x x rE ′ + ′ ′ + − − = μ σ   (A-2)
 
with boundary conditions: 
















r b w r x x E μ
 
(A-3)
The first condition in (A-3) requires that  ( ) x E  converges to the present value of the 
firm’s profits as x. The condition excludes “a bubble condition.” The second and third 
conditions require that   pastes smoothly to zero at  . These conditions are called 
the “value matching condition” and “smooth pasting condition,” respectively. 
() x E b x
Equation (A-2) is an Euler differential equation and can be solved analytically with 
the conditions (A-3), which determine the value of the firm for the equity holder and the 
































































xb 1 ,  (A-5)
where γ  is the negative root of the characteristic equation  ( ) r = ⋅ + − γ μ γ γ σ 1 2
2 . γ is 
defined by 
2 2 2 2 2 ) 2 1 ( 2 1 σ σ μ σ μ γ r + − − − = . 
21 Appendix 2. The optimization problem for the monopoly bank  
This appendix shows the solution of the optimization problem for the bank in the case 
of monopoly lending, given the bankruptcy threshold    derived in Appendix 1. 
Equation 
b x
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where    represents the value of loan for the monopolist bank. Applying Ito’s 
lemma to 
( t X D )
(A-6), we obtain the differential equation of ( ) x D : 
  () () () x x x D x x D x bM x rD b < ′ + ′ ′ + = for
2
1 2 2 μ σ ,  (A-7)
    














  () ( ) () () b x x x D x x D x w x x rD ≤ ′ + ′ ′ + − = for
2
1 2 2 μ σ ,  (A-9)















r w r x x D μ
  
(A-10)
Equations  (A-7) and (A-9) are Euler differential equations and can be solved 
analytically. Equation (A-9) is solved first, and the solution is applied for equation 
(A-7). The value of the loan and liquidation threshold xc are derived by the boundary 





































































































22 Appendix 3. The optimization problem for the leader bank  
This appendix shows the solution of the optimization problem for the leader bank in 
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(A-13), we obtain the differential equation for  ( ) t
L
i X D : 








+ + = for ,
2
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with boundary conditions: 
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+ − = for ,
2
1 2 2 μ σ   (A-16)
with boundary conditions:  
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(A-17)
Equations (A-14) and (A-16) can be solved analytically, and the value of loan and the 
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23 Appendix 4. The optimization problem for the follower bank 
This appendix shows the solution of the optimization problem for the follower bank. 
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(A-20), we obtain the differential equation of ( ) t
F
j X D : 
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+ + = for ,
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1 2 2 μ σ   (A-21)
with boundary conditions: 
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1 2 2 μ σ   (A-23)
with boundary conditions: 
() ( ) ( )
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(A-26)
The above equations can be solved backward analytically from (A-25) to (A-23) and 
24 then to (A-21). The liquidation threshold for follower   is derived by the boundary 
conditions 
c x
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